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Implications and Consequences of Post-Modern Philosophy
for Contemporary Transpersonal Studies
III. Deleuze and Some Related
Phenomenologies of Felt Meaning:
Psychosis and Mysticism as Inherent “Structures of Thought”
Harry Hunt

Brock University
Ontario, Canada
There is a surprising confluence in the philosopher Deleuze, the psychoanalyst Bion, and
phenomenological psychologist Gendlin on what Deleuze terms the immediate “sense” of
understanding and Gendlin calls “felt meaning.” Beneath its more differentiated propositional
articulations, all three understand this phenomenon as a felt sense of constantly shifting
coherence and incoherence, and based in often tacit metaphoric, figural, and/or synesthetic
processes. For Deleuze and Bion, in particular, psychotic thought disorder is understood
as the exaggeration of this incoherence potential within all felt meaning. Correspondingly,
the expansion or enhancement of the felt coherence aspect of ordinary thought becomes the
basis for the mystical states of consciousness that become a major concern of the later Bion
and Deleuze. The Indian spiritual teacher Krishnamurti, known for his use of an ordinary
language of deceptive simplicity to describe spiritual enlightenment, offers a striking
confirmation of Deleuze and Bion on numinous states as latent within all felt meaning.
Keywords: sense, felt meaning, alpha function, image schemas, cross modality,
synesthesia, physiognomy, Klein’s paranoid-schizoid position, mirroring,
Eckhart’s Godhead, immediate perception, mind of innocence
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erhaps not coincidentally, the 1960s saw three
complementary and independent attempts, by the
post-modern French philosopher Gilles Deleuze
(1925-1995), the psychoanalyst W. R. Bion (1897-1979),
and the phenomenological psychologist Eugene Gendlin,
to explicate a felt, experiential, or vivial core within all
thinking. Deleuze (1968/1994; 1969/1990) termed this
“sense,” Gendlin (1962) “felt meaning,” and Bion (1962,
1965), more opaquely as “alpha function” (in order to
avoid what he feared as misleading associations). For all
three the felt aspect of thought centered on an immediate
sense of coherence or incoherence, separate from any
subsequent or prior verbal or conceptual articulation.
Initially Deleuze and Bion would focus on psychosis and
psychotic thought disorder as the exaggeration of the
incoherence or contractive side as an inherent potential
in all thought. Later, Deleuze, Bion, and by implication
Gendlin would see mysticism and transpersonal states as
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the maximum expansion of its integrative or coherence
aspect—also as a latent potential within ordinary felt
meaning.
Phenomenologies of Felt Meaning
in Deleuze, Gendlin, and Bion
eleuze , Gendlin, and Bion were all after a “what
it is like” of thought, perhaps also entailing their
shared density and circularity of descriptive prose, to be
more linearly unpacked in what follows.
Deleuze
In his The Logic of Sense (1969/1990) Deleuze
suggests that beneath the more traditional “images of
thought,” based on classification and logic (Aristotle) or
resolution of paradox (Plato), there is a deeper, directly
sensed coherence/incoherence, as the immediately felt
singularity or “thisness” of the unfolding event. Before we
can decide a more standard propositional truth or falsity,
there is the question of whether our felt understanding
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“makes sense,” or slides toward an equally inherent sense
of nonsense, confusion, stupidity, and pointlessness—
which exaggerated becomes psychotic thought disorder.
For Deleuze these inversions of sense are part of the inner
“structures of thought as such” (1968/1994, p. 151).
There is an acephalism of thought just as there is
an amnesia in memory. ... [In psychosis] thought
is forced to think its central collapse, its fracture,
... [its inability] to manage to think something. ...
Schizophrenia is not only a human fact but also a
possibility for thought. (Deleuze, 1968/1994, pp.
147, 148)
In terms of the larger history of philosophy,
Deleuze (1969/1990) sees the first version of his “sense”
in the Stoic distinction between the “corporeals” of
physical cause and effect (as in atomistic reductionism)
and the “incorporeals” of humanly experienced events,
with their own reality or “extra being” that Deleuze will
also term “phantasm.” In this regard Deleuze might be
taken as offering, through the Stoics, his own version of
Wilhelm Dilthey’s later distinction between the cognitive
domains of causal explanation in the physical sciences
and the felt understandings of empathized hermeneutic
events (Dilthey, 1976; Hunt, 2005a). Deleuze also
locates the singularities of sense in the haecity or unique
“thisness” of an incarnated personhood in the medieval
nominalism of Duns Scotus, which, like Heidegger
(1919/2004), he traces forward into the felt “expression” of
meaning in Husserl’s phenomenology of consciousness.
All this is contained within Deleuze’s (1968/1994) larger
concern with a post-Nietzschean yea-saying metaphysics
of becoming, as the perpetual repetition of difference
and multiplicity, and a naturalistic spiritual immanence
he shared with Bataille (see Hunt, 2013).
Sense is the “surface” or “membrane” of specific
semantic meanings that for Deleuze (1969/1990) both
joins and separates the “depths” of biological “states of
affairs” and the “heights” of conceptual proposition. It
is the expressive “inside” of propositional thought, both
“encasing” and “carrying” it forward as the semantic
“beingness” of the situation. Part of its very tenuousness
and vulnerability, and conjoined potential for expansion
in spiritual states, is that it is entirely spontaneous. It
is never “constructed” or intended in the manner of a
sentence. Deleuze compares it to the Zen of archery,
where the bow fires itself. It is this immediate temporal
unfoldment of sense that William James (1890) captured
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when he observed that phenomenologically it would be
more accurate to say “it thinks” or “thoughts now” in
the same manner as “it rains”—a view also shared by
Nietzsche (1886/1954) and Heidegger, with the latter
stating “we never come to thoughts, they come to us”
(1971, p. 6). Clearly then Deleuze is reflecting the
aspect of thought most associated with the spontaneous
imaginative absorption also highlighted in creativity
research (Michalica & Hunt, 2013).
It will be significant for what follows that
the sensed coherence/incoherence of meaning has an
intrinsic metaphoric component, animating it from
within at key “turning points” and “inflections.” For
Deleuze these are the:
Bottlenecks, knots, foyers, and centers. ... critical
points just as temperature has critical points—
points of fusion, congelation, boiling, condensation,
coagulation, and crystallization. (Deleuze, 1969/1990,
pp. 52, 53).
Not only is this reminiscent of Jung on the language of
alchemy as metaphoric of spiritual development, but it
anticipates Lakoff and Johnson (1999) on an underlying
metaphoricity in all thought resting on cross modal
“image schemas” such as container/contained, center/
periphery, balance/imbalance, and multiple varieties of
links and forces. It is also similar to the phenomenon of
vocal sound physiognomies that Deleuze (1969/1990) will
make use of in his analysis of the nonsense symbolisms
of Lewis Carroll, and which had already been developed
by the cognitive psychologists Osgood (1960) and Werner
and Kaplan (1963). Their work helped to establish a crosscultural commonality of synesthetic meanings in vocal
sounds—so that a nonsense word such as “zeca” will
statistically tend to be rated as small, angular, moving, and
happy, while “voag” is felt to be large, round, static, and
sad. These intonational effects are fundamental to poetry
and vocal music (Edelson, 1975), and will be central
to Deleuze on the malevolent meanings of language in
schizophrenia. (Their more positive manifestation is of
course central to the vocal mantras of meditative practice.)
Later Deleuze and his psychoanalyst collaborator Guattari
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1972/2009; 1991/1994) will term
this the “figural” aspect of felt meaning and see its more
integrative expansion in mystical experience.1
Gendlin
Eugene Gendlin in his Experiencing and the
Creation of Meaning (1962) uses the term “felt meaning”
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in ways strikingly similar to Deleuze on sense. He calls
attention to both its indefiniteness and impossibility
of direct description, which Deleuze will refer to as
its “impassibility.” At the same time felt meaning is
so specific and singular that we sense immediately
when our propositional articulation either does not do
justice to what we so definitely sense we are “trying to
say,” or else starts to depart from it into a differing or
entirely new felt sense. It is both impalpable and the very
opposite of anything vague or indefinite. Felt meanings
are both preliminary enough to permit multiple lines
of propositional articulation and complete enough to
sustain our participation, confident or not, in many
ongoing situations without any articulation at all. Both
Gendlin and Deleuze were independently struck by the
way felt meanings can not be fully said as such, while
admitting of seemingly infinite propositions “about”
them—with each such statement preserving its felt
difference from the felt meaning it addresses.
Gendlin stresses the personal and social
significance of our felt meanings of coherence and
incoherence. It will feel crucial, and this independent
of our later realizations of its logical or factual truth,
whether we have this inner sense of felt understanding
and coherence—“getting what is going on”—or whether
we must suffer the inner loneliness and self doubt
of being “at sea”—say in a high school mathematics
class where others around us seem, whether they
really do or not, to “get it.” Although Gendlin is not
explicitly concerned with psychosis, one can see how
the chronic exaggeration of this “not understanding”
where others do would move towards the confusional
states of thought disorder. Gendlin does link the
impalpability of felt meaning to James’ (1890) concept
of the “fringe” of consciousness, while for James it was
expansions and contractions in that background of all
awareness that could describe mystical states and their
negative inversions in psychosis. For James, in The
Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), mystical states
are understood as a “deepened sense of significance” (p.
344) and all-embracing oneness—what in Gendlin’s
terms would be a felt meaning of everything. Deleuze
(1968/1994) similarly speaks of “an unconscious of pure
thought which constitutes the sphere of sense ... [with
its] infinite regress” (p. 155).
Like Deleuze, Gendlin’s felt meaning has an
imagistic or figural core. In his later writings Gendlin
(1978) would develop a method called “focusing” in
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which more inchoate felt meanings could be made
more vividly and explicitly conscious by going back and
forth between kinesthetically expressive bodily states,
congruent visual imagery, and emergent key words and
phrases. Later followers of Gendlin (Petitmengin, 2007)
have developed a more explicitly synesthetic foundation
for his concept of felt meaning, closely related to similar
attempts to establish synesthetic states of cross modal
sensory translation as the root of all metaphor (Hunt,
1985, 2005b; Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001), and
open to their own separate transpersonal development
(Hunt, 1995, 2001; Bresnick & Levin, 2006).
Bion
In his Learning from Experience (1962) the
British psychoanalyst W. R. Bion (see also 1965,
1967, 1971, 1977) understood his “alpha function” in
essentially the same way as Deleuze on sense and Gendlin
on felt meaning, as the immediate sense of coherence/
incoherence in semantic understanding. On that
depends any more specific differentiation of cognitive
proposition and specific emotional articulation. The
experiential core of coherence rests on a felt sense of
beingness in the ongoing situation—its “saturation” [or
not] as a “felt reality.” It is here that Bion will locate
an inherent capacity for spiritual realization, as the
reciprocal enhancement of felt reality that contrasts with
the contraction and loss of inner presence in psychosis:2
The belief that reality could be known is mistaken
because reality is not something which lends itself
to being known. It is impossible to know reality for
the same reason that makes it impossible to sing
potatoes; they may be grown, or pulled, or eaten,
but not sung. Reality has to be “been”; there should
be a transitive verb “to be” expressly for use with the
term “reality.” (Bion, 1965, p. 148)
As with Deleuze and Gendlin, alpha function
has an immediate imagistic basis—consistent with the
cross modal synthesis that the neurologist Geschwind
(1965) made basic to the human symbolic capacity. For
Bion alpha function is a direct manifestation of Aristotle’s
“sensus communis” or “common sense,” in which the
capacity for cross modal translation across gesture, visual
imagery, and vocal expression underpins both human
self awareness or “mirroring” and the multiple domains
of symbolization (see Hunt, 1995).
At the same time, with Deleuze, alpha function
is curiously tenuous and vulnerable, constantly on the
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verge of an unravelling of understanding that becomes
chronically exaggerated in psychotic thought disorder.
Bion is struck by the tenuousness of thought in everyone,
and our capacity to sense that, and often to sense the
demands of thinking as an unwelcome burden. He
describes:

We then respond collectively with some mixture of
delusive over-certainty, confusion, and stuporous
avoidance.

Deleuze and Bion on Psychosis
as “Structure of Thought”
It is important for what follows to stress that
Deleuze and Bion, in placing psychosis, and later
mysticism, on a continuum with ordinary felt meaning
and as a latency that is part of its very phenomenology,
are representative of an approach to psychiatry based
on qualitative description and empathic understanding.
It is part of a tradition of European existentialphenomenological analysis (Binswanger, 1963;
Minkowski, 1933/1970), more recently renewed and
extended by Sass (1992, 2000), and entirely consistent
with Harry Stack Sullivan’s well known statement about
schizophrenia, that “we are all more simply human than
otherwise” (1953, p. 32). As a method of understanding,
related to Deleuze’s “incorporeals” of sense, it is
potentially consistent with any contemporary causal,
“corporeal” explanations of these chronic distortions of
felt meaning in terms of genetics and/or neurochemistry.
It is also relevant that while the approach of Deleuze
and Bion to psychosis as the exaggeration of an
incoherence within all thought is purely qualitative,
it is fully consistent with current quantitative research
on high creativity as associated with medium to higher
levels of schizotypal and bipolar personality, while the
very highest levels tend instead to shut down these same
processes of creative application (Michalica & Hunt,
2013).
Deleuze
In approaching schizophrenia as an intrinsic
“possibility of thought,” a vulnerability first appearing at
the “surface” of sense, Deleuze (1969/1990) begins with
several autobiographical essays by F. Scott Fitzgerald
(1936/1993). Fitzgerald, in contrast to his wife Zelda
who advanced into clinical schizophrenia, described his
own painful period of loss of a sensed self-being, inner
presence, and felt reality, bearing a striking similarity to
Sass (2000) on the preclinical or prodromal signs of loss
of felt meaning that can precede psychotic diagnosis.
For Deleuze this is a diminution of the “compossibility”
of sense—the degree to which its multiple organizing
points of “inflection” are felt as belonging together in a
vital unfolding whole. Fitzgerald likened himself during
this period to a “cracked plate,” still of limited household
use but not unless it is kept away from the stresses of
any overheating. In this context, Deleuze describes the
initial dilemma of both the alcoholic and schizophrenic
as not having:
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the inability of even the most advanced human
beings to make use of their thoughts because the
capacity to think is rudimentary in all of us. (Bion,
1962, p. 14).
This is a striking statement. One would not say similarly
that “the capacity to fly is rudimentary in all eagles,” but
rather that this species defining characteristic is perfectly
adapted to their ecological niche. Yet as human beings
we often sense a constant struggle with the symbolic
capacity that defines us.
With Deleuze and Guattari (1972/2009), this
tenuousness of thought can have a significant collective
aspect for Bion. Indeed, the writings of all three thinkers
appeared in an era that combined a radical spirit of
experiential exploration and confrontation with the
beginnings of an accelerating awareness of now global
problems of humanity in governance, population,
ecology, and economic disparity that seem to be beyond
the cognitive capacity for solution by the very minds
that created them. A widespread feeling that these issues
somehow do not “make sense,” and of contemporary life
as failing to “cohere” or “hold together,” is strikingly
anticipated by Bion as a collective version of thought
disorder:
The problems which reality poses can turn out to be
beyond the capacity of the human mind. ... where we
are sufficiently ... advanced to grasp the magnitude
of our problems, but are not sufficiently advanced
to know what to do about them. ... This, I think, is
the situation in which the autistic child finds itself.
... so highly intelligent that it is capable of seeing the
vastness of its problems, but without any equipment
with which to deal with it. The human race may be
reaching a similar point ... at which the most gifted,
most capable of our thinkers may be ... inadequately
equipped for the realities of the situation in which
we find ourselves. (Bion, 1974, pp. 134-5)

tried anything special beyond their power, and yet
they wake up as if from a battle that has been too
much for them ... aware of a silent crack in themselves.
(Deleuze, 1969/1990, p. 154, 155)
He quotes from Fitzgerald, describing himself in the mid
1930s as suffering:
a sort of blow that comes from within—that you
don’t feel until it’s too late to do anything about it. ...
Holding myself very carefully like cracked crockery
... it occurred to me ... that of all natural forces,
vitality is the incommunicable one ... you have it or
you haven’t. ... This [vacuous quiet] was something
I could neither accept nor struggle against. ... It was
strange to have no self—to be like a little boy left
alone in a big house, who knew that now he could
do anything he wanted ... but found that there was
nothing he wanted to do. (Fitzgerald, 1936/1993,
pp. 69, 74, 76, 78, 79)
Deleuze likens the maximum incompossibility or
fragmentation of meaning in full schizophrenic thought
disorder to an involuntary infliction of the nonsense
words and phrases dramatized in the Alice books of Lewis
Carroll. With words like “slithy,” “snark,” and “uffish,”
incompossibility has contracted to the point where the
sound of the word “says its own sense. It denotes what
it expresses and expresses what it denotes” (Deleuze,
1969/1990, p. 67). There can be no true or false here but
only a sort of narrowed “sense in excess” (p. 78). As his
major example of this fragmentation of ordinary words
into the malevolent intrusive meanings of psychosis,
Deleuze cites the surrealist actor and playwright Antonin
Artaud and his accounts of his own schizophrenic
episodes, also used by Sass (1992) to illustrate the
hyper-reflexive, involuntary introspective sensitization
that characterizes schizophrenia. Artaud’s accounts
(as cited by Deleuze, 1969/1990) show an involuntary
disinhibition of Werner and Kaplan’s (1963) vocal sound
physiognomies, normally subordinated within the
larger context of sentences. Deleuze mentions Artaud’s
specific dislike of the nonsense humour of Lewis Caroll,
since the latter seemed to be mocking the malevolent
physiognomies that Artaud had to suffer, where the
sounds of words intruded like “physical wounds”—
“wounding unbearable sonorous qualities [that] invade
the body” (Deleuze, 1969/1990, p. 88). This experience
of fragmented meanings as bizarre physical sensations
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felt within the body will become central to Deleuze and
Guattari’s (1972/2009) later use of psychosis to explicate
the inner structure of all thought.
Bion
Bion (1962, 1965, 1967) similarly locates
schizophrenic thought disorder as the exaggeration of the
ordinary incoherence and fragility of all felt meaning.
In the confusional states of psychosis this fragmentation
takes the form of separate “beta elements” or “bizarre
objects” in which word-sensations become intrusive
physical “things” and outward objects become animated
by thought-like physiognomies—an ordinary door-knob
suddenly fascinating with an uncanny malevolence.
Very much in the spirit of Bion on the more ordinary
roots of such incoherence, the psychoanalyst Harold
F. Searles (1979) has described the common phases
experienced in writing an academic paper as milder
forms of clinical thought-disorder: 1) Initially there
can be that burst of intuitive insight whose enthusiasm
soon proves premature and unworkable—a mentality
that chronically exaggerated would approximate the
“megalomania” and “over-inclusiveness” of delusion.
2) This premature sense of all-embracing intuitive
truth can be followed by a phase of panic at the sheer
diversity of all the “facts” that should be included,
now appearing as the “meaningless” fragments of one’s
previous insight—and which exaggerated in confusional
states becomes Bion’s over-concretized beta elements. 3)
This confusional overwhelm can then alternate with a
period of stasis, a reactive mental blankness, shutdown,
and apathy—an empty painful waiting for something
to happen. Exaggerated in psychosis this becomes
catatonic stupor and trance-like “blocking” of thought.
Just as milder versions of these states can alternate back
and forth in intellectual work, Chapman (1967) found a
similar rapid shifting in the self-reports of schizophrenic
patients between over-inclusive delusions, confusional
disorganization, and stuporous blocking.
For Bion, in both intellectual work and psychotic
thought disorder, there is the dilemma of how to wait
within the gap of unfilled time-ahead with sufficient
patience and faith to allow an integrative coming
together, or “saturation,” of orienting pre-conception
and “selected fact” into a coherent and sustainable sense
of felt meaning. The patient, rendered hyper-sensitive to
this sheer openness of time-ahead, responds to it with a
“nameless dread” and defends against that with delusion,
confusional fragmentation, and stupor. Both in these
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extremes of “attacks on linking,” and in the ordinary
sense of thought as burden and incipient incoherence,
Bion finds a “hatred of thought” in which the mind turns
against itself and its capacity for cognitive and emotional
transformation. Bion finds this rejection amplified in
myths of the tree of knowledge in Eden, the tower of
Babel, and the threat and riddle of the Sphinx in Oedipus.
Where the mystic comes to directly experience this timeahead as a “formless infinite” and “being” that answers
and completes that openness, the patient, while sensitive
on a similar level to this inner form of thought itself,
experiences it as a terrifying emptiness and deadness, in
which space seems strangely frozen and static and time
stopped. This sense of inner stoppage, as the opposite of
the dynamic open spaciousness of mystical states (Tulku,
1977), is conveyed in multiple autobiographic accounts of
schizophrenia (Sechehaye, 1951; Minkowski, 1933/1970;
Eigen, 1996). In this regard psychosis (and mysticism)
appear as a sort of “involuntary introspection” (Hunt,
1984, 1995, 2007; Sass, 1992, 2000, 2014) amplifying
the inner dynamics of coherence/incoherence within
the felt meaning described more or less in common by
Deleuze, Gendlin, and Bion.
Mysticism and Psychosis
as Reciprocal Amplifications
of the Inner Form of Thought
or both Deleuze and Bion, psychosis and mystical
states reflect, in Deleuze’s terms, the maximum
“incompossibility” and maximum “compossibility”
respectively, of the felt sense of semantic meaning. It
seems striking that both Deleuze and Bion independently
use, as their understanding of the normally embedded
inner structure of thought, the British psychoanalyst
Melanie Klein’s (1963) model of a “paranoid-schizoid
position” of early infancy. This was her controversial
view of an initial “oral” organization of “part object”
fragments of not yet integrated whole “imagos” of
the primal parents, supposedly felt by the infant as
physically inside its body in much the way described as
the intrusive internal energies of the body hallucinations
suffered by adult schizophrenics. Although Deleuze and
Bion will develop Klein’s model to somewhat different
effect, both, Bion most explicitly, will move past the fixed
implication in classical psychoanalytic thinking of both
states as “regressions” to infancy, toward a more formal
understanding. This brings both better in line with more
recent cognitive understandings of both schizophrenia
(Sass, 1992, 2000) and mystical experience (Hunt, 1984,

1995) as developmentally complex transformations of a
more abstract self awareness.
Deleuze and Guattari
In Anti-Oedipus (1972/2009), as part of
the anti-psychiatry movement of the 1960s also
associated with R. D. Laing (1967), Deleuze and his
psychoanalyst collaborator Felix Guattari described
a single “schizophrenic process” as the radical “uncoding,” “de-habituation,” or “de-territorialization” of
mind that releases an “unchanneled energy” necessary
for the revolutionary individual creative artist, shaman,
and mystic, but within which the schizophrenic
patient becomes defensively frozen. Invoking Wilhem
Reich’s (1961) concept of an orgone energy whose
full release becomes a “cosmic consciousness,” and
which is approached but finally blocked in psychosis,
Deleuze and Guattari describe the aim of their new
“schizoanalysis” to “take apart egos ... and liberate
the pre-personal singularities they enclose ... as freed
energies” (1972/2009, p. 362). In schizophrenia the
patient’s experience is “pulled down into the depths of
the body by [oral] sexualization” (Deleuze, 1969/1990, p.
218). Deleuze and Guattari (1972/2009) understand the
resulting body hallucinations in terms of Artaud’s “body
without organs” (BwO) as his “pure intensities” of inner
energy flow that obliterate the ordinary sense of body
image based self-identity. Patients do indeed describe the
experience of a hollowed body full of bizarrely disruptive
expressive energies (Angyal, 1936). Deleuze and Guattari
understand these “intensities” with Jung, rather than
Freud, as a generalized libido whose narrowed pole is
“sexual,” but most full expression is “numinous.” “The
body-without-organs is not God. ... But the energy that
sweeps through it is divine” (1972/2009, p. 13). Citing
Laing, they regard madness as more “breakthrough”
than “breakdown.”
By the time of their next book A Thousand Plateaus
(1980/1987), however, their earlier “revolutionary”
stance of a single monolithic “schizophrenic process”
had softened. The experience of body-without-organs is
now explicitly stated as not regressive and as coming in
multiple forms that can undergo their own development.
In particular, acknowledging Artaud’s own despair and
sense of meaninglessness even in his own forays into
Native American shamanism, they distinguish between
the “empty” BwO of schizophrenia and its “full” form
in realized shamanic-mystical states, briefly citing
Castaneda and the evocative accounts of mescaline
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imagery in the writings of Henri Michaux (1956/1972).
In their final major collaboration, What is Philosophy?
(1991/1994), numinous experience is understood as the
full development of the “figural” aspect of sense, now
more clearly separated from the conceptual thought
of philosophy, and most clearly expressed in Chinese
hexagrams, Hindu mandalas, and Sufi imaginal realms,
as well as in the inner “energies,” “vibrations,” and
“speech” of psychedelic drug experience.
It is important to emphasize that these references
to mystical states remain largely as allusions, and are
never developed more explicitly in the directions then
well underway in transpersonal psychology. Deleuze and
Guattari understand the release of these inner energies
in Artaud and Michaux as “corporeal,” and taking them
literally and physically, reject only suggestions that they
be interpreted as transformations of “body-image” that
would exteriorize metaphor. More recent accounts of
bodily hallucinations in schizophrenia (Sass, 1992) and the
more expansive chakra activations and flow experiences in
meditation (Hunt, 1995) would regard these experiences
as intensified gestural/metaphoric expressions—bringing
them more in line with Lakoff and Johnson (1999) and
Werner and Kaplan (1963) on the spatial-metaphoric
foundations of felt meaning. This Deleuze (1969/1990)
certainly anticipated but did not further develop.
Before proceeding to Bion’s more explicit
anticipation of a cognitive psychology of mysticism,
Deleuze and Guattari (1972/1990) also developed
their own speculative sociology of the relation between
the evolution of society and a perhaps too broadly
defined “schizophrenic process” for the genesis of
individual creativity and its revolutionary potential.
They distinguished a progression of societal complexity,
from tribal, to agricultural, primitive kingship, feudal,
mercantile, and global capitalism, characterized by what
they call an increasing “de-territorialization” and an
increasingly abstract and monetary flow of quantifiable
power. At each of these stages there is the ever present
possibility of a more regressive “despotic structure”
being imposed as the narrower channeling of energy of a
repressive power—a continuous potential for an incipient
“fascism” that can ever assert itself anew.3 In their view
the nuclear family of modern capitalism, with its oedipal
or primal horde, “despotic structure,” channels but also
holds in check the potential creativity of the increased
individuality needed for modern capitalist economies to
function.
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Classical psychoanalysis and most contemporary
forms of psychotherapy are seen as actually maintaining
this “repressive” structure, while their own more
radical “schizoanalysis,” based on pre-egoic Kleinian
fragmentation, would support the hyper-differentiation
needed for the more complete release of the revolutionary
creative potential of a fully emancipated individual.
Beneath the repressive oedipal pattern, the free flow of
energy in capitalism is seen as implicitly encouraging a
similar un-coding flow within the individual. This also
means that modern capitalism unwittingly encourages
schizophrenia as the maximum freeing of channelized
energy within the individual.4 The need for social
adaptation will tend to hold that final fragmentation in
check, rejecting it as “pathological,” while artists, mystics,
and creative rebels will push through some such inner
crisis to a more complete independence of the individual
than was possible in any prior social order. For Deleuze
and Guattari this offers the only potential for a deeply
needed valuative revolution within contemporary global
capitalism.5
A less radical implication not addressed by
Deleuze and Guattari, but consistent with the broader
sociology of religions developed by Max Weber
(1922/1963) and Ernst Troeltsch (1931/1992), and the
closely related post-Nietzschean naturlaistic spirituality
of Bataille (1954/1988; Hunt, 2013), is that modern
capitalism, with its materialism and prioritizing of
the individual, will favor, and especially so for the
educated classes, “this-worldly” or “new age” forms
of individualizing mystical renewal over the more
communal prophetic religions. In this regard, Deleuze
and Guattari’s own formulations of “schizoanalysis,” and
implied advocacy of shamanism, Sufism, and Taoism
would be part of that broader tendency. Bion (1971)
too saw a reciprocal relation, sometimes commensurate,
sometimes destructive, between “mystic,” as creative
individual, and “group” as characteristic of modernity.
It will fit well with Deleuze and Bion that recent
quantitative research in creativity, shows that while
those engaged in individual creative endeavors do show
evidence of considerable inner conflict (above) they also
report unusually high levels of spontaneous mystical
states (Michalica & Hunt, 2013).
Bion as “Psychoanalytic Mystic”
Bion’s (1962) use of Klein’s model of a paranoidschizoid pattern of infancy, as the outer manifestation
of what is later to be internalized as the inner structure
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of thought, is more consistent with developments in
subsequent infant research than the more cursory
treatment of Deleuze and Guattari. For Bion, and his
fellow psychoanalyst D. W. Winnicott (1971), Klein’s
pattern is based on what would later be termed the
early reciprocal “mirroring” relation between infant and
mothering one (Meltzoff, 2002). This is the cross modal
integration between the infant’s inchoate kinesthetic sense
of itself and the visual facial and vocal expressions of the
primal parents, as manifested in early reciprocal smiling
and later shared expressive vocalization. Internalized
in subsequent development, these mirrorings become
the inner structure of the dialogic matrix of thought
(Meltzoff, 2002). A later form of this same process of
developmental internalization of outer behavior into
inner form will be the shift from childhood “egocentric
speech” of thoughts-out-loud to the later silent “inner
speech” of “verbal thought” (Vygotsky, 1965).
Winnicott (1971) had described the way in
which the infant discovers the reflection back of its own
emotional and kinesthetic expressions in the nurturant
face of the mothering one, allowing its gradual
internalization as the human form of self-awareness and
first sense of identity. For Winnicott that internalization
will leave open how much of the infant’s kinesthetic
emotive experience can be “held” and “contained” by
the primal parents for subsequent reflection and selfrecognition, and this will also vary in terms of infant
temperament and child rearing practices.6 Bion’s (1962)
version of this mirroring process further develops its
intrinsic conflictual aspects. In his more dynamic
account the relative instabilities of early infant emotion
mean that its panics and frustrated rages are felt as
“projectively identified” into the mirroring parent, whose
directly responsive calm, to the extent it can be present
in response to an upset infant, allows a “detoxification”
of those intolerable and ejected experience fragments
(beta elements). It is only then that the infant can come
to tolerate their modified reflection back as part of its
own growing capacity for awareness of self.
For Bion (1962, 1965, 1971) this intrinsic
turbulence of early mirroring becomes part of the inner
dialogic structure and “burden” of an internalized
symbolic capacity or “alpha function,” with its constant
dialectic between felt coherence and an always incipient
incoherence. Within ongoing thought the inner form
of this mirroring relation is reflected in a continuous
tension between “pre-conception” and “selected

fact,” which, to use the terminology of Piaget (1968),
will undergo their own reciprocal assimilation and
accommodation to arrive at whatever “saturation” and
felt reality is possible in that situation. Bion sees this
process in terms of an inner “turbulence” between
the “no-thing” of an incipient but not yet “holding”
thought, whose originary template is an initially non
responding or absent mothering one, and the “fact” to
be understood—which may or may not be “contained”
and “reflected back,” and whose template in turn will be
the infant’s emotive state. His often dense language for
the inner dynamics of the internalized “alpha function”
of thought echoes Gendlin’s (1962) somewhat more
accessible phenomenology of a constant inner challenge
in coordinating our inchoate “felt meanings,” whether
of interpersonal situation or abstract concept, with our
successive attempts at their specific articulations—often
acutely feeling the inadequacy and incoherence of what
we actually say compared to what we feel and mean.
It would presumably reflect this internalized
reciprocity within all thought that, in Bionian terms,
either felt meaning or its attempted articulation can
alternatively be identified with either the “containing”
mothering one or expressive infant, since at any point
in the unfoldment of understanding either phase can
be felt as “container” or “contained.” Each phase will
seek its subsequent “holding” and “reflection” from
the receiving “other,” while also constituting its own
“containment” of a preceding expressive phase. Both
felt meaning and its propositional specification seek to
“mirror” each other—always approaching or avoiding a
continuously shifting reciprocity.
Bion is focused on the reflections of this
reciprocal process in the more developmentally complex
levels of abstract self awareness involved in creativity,
psychosis, and mysticism, where intensifications of
experience will most directly exteriorize the inner form
of thought itself. This will entail the sensitivity to the
openness of time ahead as such, which then must await,
or tolerate the waiting for, a corresponding “answer” or
“containment”—to the extent that might be possible (or
not) for a given person, cultural era, or a given level of
more specific creative endeavor. It is these “form near”
levels of thought that most directly reveal the turbulence
intrinsic to its inner structure.
For Bion this capacity to directly sense the
openness of time ahead, as part of the inner form of
meaning, gives rise to an intrinsic or existential anxiety
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that may or may not be “contained” in any completed
realization. Intolerance of this intrinsic ambiguity gives
rise to the various “pathologies” of thinking in which
we may close off all deeper inquiry, suffer its confusion,
or falsely finish it with precocious and premature
“answers”—which are what Bion terms the “disease
of the question.” Creativity for Bion will require what
Keats referred to as “negative capability”—the capacity
to remain within the open uncertainty of time ahead, “of
being in uncertainties, doubts, mysteries, without any
irritable reaching after fact and reason” (Bion, 1971, p.
125). This for Bion requires a capacity for “patience” and
“faith” which is what in the extreme the psychotic patient
must avoid at all costs—since time ahead inspires there
what Bion, quoting Pascal, calls the “terrifying silence
of infinite spaces” (Bion, 1965, p. 171). In psychosis the
experience of a potential openness of Being is felt as a
“persecutory” and intolerable domain of “nonexistence,”
“emptiness,” and “death” (p. 120). The average person,
less sensitive to this immediacy of consciousness, will be
able to deflect such anxieties by everyday over-certainties
and confusions well short of clinical thought disorder.
The mystic remains fully open to this inner form
of time ahead with the resulting potential to experience
its spontaneous completion as a “formless infinite”
or “Being,” rather reminiscent of the later Heidegger
(1972), as its mirroring “answer” and “holding.” Bion
takes “formless infinite” from Milton, while also using
Meister Eckhart’s (14th century/1941) concept of an all
originating emptiness of Godhead as a model of thought
in which a tacit “felt source of undeveloped distinctions”
(Bion, 1965, p. 162) “incarnates” within time ahead as the
more specific forms of meaning. Where this “unrealized”
source is fully experienced as such it will be felt as a state
of “ultimate reality”—and sensed as sacred. To the extent
that the inner turbulence intrinsic to this deep level of
symbolization can be accepted, then experience can open
into this sense of an inner redemption. Such experience
presupposes a capacity for an abstract form of self
awareness that is the opposite of anything “regressive.”
Thus Bion, “the psychoanalytic mystic” (Eigen, 1998),
sees spirituality, with Maslow (1962), as a needed adult
development that cannot be assimilated to Freud’s (1930)
account of an “oceanic experience” of infancy:
The patient’s relationship with God was disturbed
by [fixated memories of the primal parents]
which prevented an ineffable experience by their
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concreteness and therefore unsuitability to represent
the realization. ... [This] would extend psychoanalytic theory to cover the views of mystics. ...
The psycho-analyst [then] accepts the reality of
reverence and awe, the possibility of a disturbance
in the individual which makes atonement and ...
an expression of reverence and awe impossible. The
central postulate is that atonement with ultimate
reality ... is essential to harmonious mental growth.
(Bion, 1967, p. 145).
Here Bion offers his own version of an immanent or
naturalistic mysticism earlier developed by Nietzsche,
Heidegger, Bataille, and Jung (see Hunt, 2013), one also
foreshadowed by Deleuze, but whose references to a thisworldly mysticism remain more allusive.
A Supporting Cognitive Psychology
of Mystical States
Further support for Bion’s approach can be
found in the author’s own development of a holistic
cognitive psychology of mystical states that would see
them as abstract synesthesias of a maximally unitive felt
meaning, in which the sequential openness of time is
cross modally translated into the only figural pattern
that is equally open and pervasive, namely the visual
form of luminous spaciousness (Hunt, 1989, 1995,
2006). Such abstract cross modally based felt meanings
would not be available to the infant of Klein or anyone
else, where the beginnings of cross modal experience are
limited to the more concrete translations of facial and
gestural expression. The later semantic color synesthesias
for letters, numbers, and categories of time common in
mid childhood also remain on a more concrete cognitive
level (Hunt, 2011; Novoa & Hunt, 2009). It is only the
mystical states of adolescence and adulthood, and their
occasional precocious precursors in some children, that
will require the more abstract synesthesias of light to
express and become the felt meaning of an all-embracing
“ultimate reality.”
However, if felt meaning always rests on cross
modal translation, then any translation of the relatively
more specified kinesthetic body image into the
luminosity of open spaciousness will also be experienced
as its actual or incipient dissolution into that light—if
it is to match the openness of light as felt metaphor.
There would follow the sense described in so much
ecstatic experience of a felt “annihilation” or “death”
of a self-identity that is ultimately grounded in a sense
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of bodily presence (Hunt, 2007). This sense of bodily
dissolution makes more understandable the blockage
and terror described by some psychotic patients
over just such an imminent annihilation (Schreber,
1903/1955; Chapman, 1967), and their occasional
accounts of spontaneous remissions following the more
complete surrender that can result in classical mystical
states (Boisen, 1936/1952; Van Dusen, 1972). At the
same time it would also follow for many persons that
spontaneous ecstatic states, whatever their temporary
bliss and unitive sense of redemption, can have later
more destabilizing effects on a still needed sense of
personal identity (Almaas, 1986; Eigen, 2001).
Following also Lakoff and Johnson (1999) on
the perceptual roots of metaphor underlying all forms
of thought, it makes sense that individual performance
on tasks of spatial orientation and physical balance,
which have a central body-image component, tends
to be statistically superior in those who frequently
report spontaneous mystical states and more integrative
altered states such as lucid dreaming, while psychotic
patients, and those describing more dissociative
states and nightmares, tend to show especially low
spatial task performance (Hunt, 2007; Gackenbach
& Bosveld, 1989). To the extent that sense of selfidentity rests, ultimately on spatial body-image, the
moment by moment cross modal disassembling of
perceptual patterns in search of expressive metaphors
for unfolding felt meanings would become part of
the incipient turbulence and challenge to coherence
described by Deleuze, Bion, and Gendlin. The extent
of such turbulence, and the capacity to allow its fuller
felt completions in mystical states, would thus vary in
terms of the relative cohesiveness in the very sense of self
that has to be surrendered. Accordingly the beginnings
of such openness will be sensed predominantly as
incipient freedom and release for some, or “nameless
dread” for others, while for most it can initiate the more
ambivalent descriptions of death-rebirth crisis in classical
shamanism, spontaneous ecstasy, and psychedelic drug
experience (Eliade, 1964; Laski, 1961; Grof, 1980).
Some Implications
for Transpersonal Studies
hile one could wonder why Deleuze, in contrast
to Bion, did not further pursue the transpersonal
implications of his phenomenology of “sense,” it will be
the Indian teacher Krishnamurti who completes this
linkage from the side of spiritual realization.

Mystical States as Manifestations
of the Inner Form of Thought
Although Deleuze and Guattari do not develop
their more indirect discussions of mystical experience
to the extent of the later writings of Bion (1965, 1967,
1971), their shared view of its enhancement of a figural
dimension within all felt meaning, and their implied
overlap with Gendlin’s more circumscribed account,
supports the view of mystical and psychotic states as
intensifications of the intrinsic tension between coherence
and incoherence all thought. Both Deleuze and Bion start
with the incoherence side of psychotic thought disorder,
and later shift to the enhanced coherence of mystical
states—Deleuze and Guattari in their discussion of the
“full” body-without-organs and Bion on the timeless
experience of Being as the “holding” and fulfillment of
the unknown of time ahead.
Both Deleuze and Bion make use of Klein’s
concept of a paranoid-schizoid position of early infancy,
which might seem to necessitate a reductionist or
regressive understanding of psychotic and mystical states
that both, however, explicitly reject. Deleuze and Guattari
(1980/1987) do not elaborate on their later conclusion
that the body-without-organs of inner energetic
transformation comes in many forms and undergoes its
own development. By contrast Bion explicitly separates
adult spiritual realization, as a maturation of emotional
intelligence, from all more concrete fixations of “memory
and desire” that can block and distort it. The potential
for mystical experience, and its failure to develop in
psychosis, show in exaggeration the inner structure of all
thought.
That structure is most clearly visible in these
states and in its first outward manifestations in the
“mirroring” relations of infancy. These first expressions
of a cross modal capacity for a dialogically patterned felt
meaning are what become internalized in subsequent
development as “thought.” The formal similarities of Bion
and Winnicott’s version of “mirroring” to transpersonal
states thus do not support the regression model put
forward by a more traditional psychoanalysis, but show
entirely different developmental levels of externalization
of the form of thought itself—concrete and behavioral
in infancy vs. abstractly symbolic in mystical states.
To add to Bion, the internalization of infant mirroring
would establish that form as the common matrix for all
“frames” of human intelligence, while the development of
an abstract capacity for self awareness as part of Piagetian
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formal operations, where fully realized within a primarily
experiential “emotional intelligence,” will instantiate the
form-near level of experience which will make mystical
states possible (see Hunt, 1995, 2001; Dale, 2014).
A question remains as to why the repeated
allusions of Deleuze and Guattari (1972/2009, 1980/1987,
1991/1994) to mystical experience, shamanism, the later
Reich, and Michaux on psychedelic drug states are left
largely undeveloped. If anything they tend in their later
discussions to emphasize more a separation between
the figural/metaphoric enhancements of mystical states
and conceptual thought, on the one hand, and the
disintegrative “energies” of psychosis from their earlier
linkage to the “incorporeals” of sense, on the other.
While a standard criticism of Deleuze and Guattari
from a predominantly secular mainstream philosophy,
suspicious of all that is “non rational,” has been their
interest in “mysticism” (Smith & Somers-Hall, 2012), one
could as easily argue, with Ramey (2012), that they did
not go far enough.8
Certainly this failure to further develop their
repeated allusions to these same immanent mysticisms,
also coincides with Deleuze and Guattari’s increasing
preoccupation with a more unitive speculative metaphysics
of “assemblage” or “machines of desire” as self-organizing
systems common to both human and physical science
(1980/1987, 1991/1994). These “assemblages” are
reminiscent, as Deleuze (1988/1993) brings out, of
the monads of Leibniz, as dynamic gestalts of varying
complexity and self awareness that equally organize
inanimate, animate, and human reality. Deleuze and
Guattari are here anticipating current sciences of chaos
mathematics and self organizing systems of emergence
and downward control.9 From the present perspective,
however, that may have come at the cost of any further
development of a highly original phenomenology of
thought—distinct from the physical in its incorporality,
singularity of meaning, mode of temporal unfoldment, and
exteriorization in the enhanced coherence/incoherence of
mystical and psychotic states. What had been Deleuze’s
earlier hermeneutic distinction between causation and
forms of meaning may have become less important from
his final metaphysically unitive conceptual perspective.
Krishnamurti on Self-Realization
and Felt Meaning
Perhaps it should not be as surprising as it
was initially to this author that Deleuze, Bion, and
by further implication Gendlin, overlap so strikingly
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with the Indian spiritual teacher Krishnamurti on the
latency of a mystical self-realization within ordinary
felt meaning. While Deleuze and Bion approach
transpersonal experience from outside any traditional
spiritual system or special language, Krishnamurti, after
his own spontaneous enlightenment and emancipation
from his earlier training within Besant and Leadbeater’s
Theosophical Society (Landau, 1964), also became
widely recognized for his extreme simplicity of
ordinary usage to convey an enlightenment always
implicit within semantic experience (Mehta, 1973).10
For Krishnamurti there is an “immediate perception,”
the seeming equivalent of Deleuze’s figural dimension,
within the felt understanding of any situation, which
if it is not more typically deflected into “verbalization,”
will spontaneously “complete” itself as an experience of
“pure energy” and “newness.” This is a felt “communion”
with the Beingness of that situation (Mehta, 1973)—
essentially the sense of the numinous as understood by
Deleuze and Bion.
For Krishnamurti these are the rare moments
of “pure intelligence” or “mind of innocence,” which
can be most prominent in nature, and convey a felt
“eternity” outside the ordinary “continuity of time—
which is based instead on our more usual elaborations of
a socially conditioned memory, desire, and self-identity.
It is intriguing in this regard that for both Deleuze
and Bion, with Krishnamurti, the sense of oneself as
“thinker” is actually secondary to “thoughts,” only
emerging after their more primary and spontaneous
unfoldment—again, the “it thinks” of James and
Nietzsche. For Krishnamurti, as for Bion (1971), this
spontaneous “newness” of “total attention” is not possible
as long as there is any felt division between “what is”
and “what should be.” Thus he rules out any systematic
meditative practice, since this presupposes an alienating
dissatisfaction with one’s here and now experience.
Where Deleuze, Bion, and Gendlin all
distinguish a knowing through propositions from a
primary beingness of felt meaning, Krishnamurti also
separates our verbal “knowing by ideation” from the
“knowing by Being” in moments of “total attention.”
Very much like Bion on the openness of time ahead
“incarnating” itself as a “formless infinite” expressing
itself as the singularity of each situation, Krishnamurti
describes the potential for a fully allowed “immediate
perception” to reveal an “inner immensity” of space
whose “negativity” of pure openness—as an emptiness
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and inner stillness—can receive the totality of any
situation. “Since the negative contains nothing, it alone
can receive the whole” (Mehta, 1973, p. 275).11
Just as for Bion this spaciousness is “denuded”
of its incipient beingness in psychosis, Krishnamurti also
discusses a more destructive “inversion” of immediate
perception, where the “passive” cessation of verbal
mind, without that openness and immediate acceptance
of “what is,” produces a frightening blankness and
loneliness. It would be only the non resistant acceptance
of the felt qualities of that loneliness that can transform
it into a more open “aloneness,” out of which comes a
“silence” that is
without cause, and therefore has no beginning or
end...and to such a mind...comes a marvelous silence
[which] there are no words to describe ... and if you
have gone that far, then you are enlightened, you do
not seek anything. (Krishnamurti, 1971, p. 93)
Where Bion and Winnicott stress the sense
of a nurturant “holding” within the inner form of felt
meaning, Krishnamurti similarly compares the “mind
of innocence” and “communion” to the “nurturant”
warmth and moisture of soil that receives and fosters
the planted seed. In other words Krishnamurti’s “mind
of innocence” is also structured maternally, and so
dialogically. Just as Deleuze and Guattari (1972/2009)
see the creatively released individual as the only avenue
for genuine social change, Krishnamurti sees the only
potential for profound social impact in the individual
“mind of innocence.” Society for all three approaches is
necessarily static, and rooted in what Krishnamurti terms
a secondary, culturally imposed, “associative learning.”
For Krishnamurti, a badly needed revolutionary social
change can only come from the impact of the individual
“mind of innocence” that received back by others
“completes itself” in them. Bion describes a similar
opening in the client from the therapist’s own elimination
of “memory and desire.” In Krishnamurti’s terms, “the
unexplained innocent behavior of the one initiates in
the other a movement for fundamental transformation”
(Mehta, 1973, p. 447). The spontaneous completion of
the figural or felt foundations of “immediate perception”
in the one inspires its mirroring in others, and that alone
for Krishnamurti can fulfill and justify civilization.
This would describe the charismatic impact of the major
spiritual teachers of history. Otherwise, Krishnamurti is
every bit as devastating in his social critique as Deleuze
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and Guattari on “schizoanalysis” as the only authentic
response to modern culture.
Conclusions
igures as diverse as Lakoff and Johnson (1999),
Wittgenstein (1980), and Ricoeur (1977) have
understood the human symbolic capacity as resting on
a metaphoric “seeing as” in which one thing—whether
as object or vocal sound—becomes the vehicle or “lens
seen through” by which another is taken as referent.
For Bion the deep structure of this “seeing as” is that
of internalized interpersonal relationship. He is also
saying that this “link” of metaphor and referent bridges
what he would later (1977) term an intrinsic “caesura,”
gap, or delay within the very structure of relating. This
masks an inner nothingness or primal sense of absence
of “other”—always latent within symbolic experience
—which the psychotic comes to directly experience as
incipient annihilation and the mystic comes to accept
as openness to an answering reflection back of Being.
Ordinary knowing and feeling buffers and shields
us from both these closely conjoined possibilities that
Deleuze also saw as always implied at some level within
all symbolic expression.
Deleuze, Bion, to a considerable degree Gendlin,
and Krishnamurti together understand a “felt meaning”
or “immediate perception” as the basis for all thought,
along with its latent potential for expansion as spiritual
realization. This intriguing convergence of views is the
closest contemporary version this author has encountered
to the Buddhist “mind-as-such” of enlightenment and
“mind applied” of everyday life as reciprocal expressions
of an ever present “ordinary mind of nowness”
(Wang-Ch’ug Dor-je, 16th Century/1978; Guenther,
1989). Here philosopher, mystic, psychoanalyst, and
phenomenological psychologist all “see the same.”
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Notes
1. Given that Deleuze, Gendlin, and Bion are all
centered on the more immediately intuitive and
metaphor based aspects of thought, it is of interest
that Kounios et al (2008) found that subjects who
solved problems more intuitively than logically
showed resting EEG records with higher right
hemisphere activation in the frontal-temporal areas
sometimes linked to felt meaning and parietal areas
linked to metaphor. While Wittgenstein (1980)
famously rejected the notion that any inner sense of
meaning can be used to define the primary social
pragmatics of language, at the same time he also
called the experience of meaning a “physiognomy”
and suggested that where it is lacking, one is
“meaning blind.”
2. Bion, who has been termed “the psychoanalytic
mystic” (Eigen, 1998), has had an almost revolutionary impact on contemporary psychoanalytic
theory, insisting that theoretical and clinical
psychoanalysis can be entirely consistent, as
Jung had originally maintained, with an intrinsic
spiritual dimension of mind. In this regard Bion’s
work builds a bridge into transpersonal psychology,
also developed by Almaas (1986) and Wilber (1984),
such that transpersonal states intrinsically interact
with psychodynamic issues without being reducible
to them. Excellent summaries of Bion’s overall work
can be found in Symington and Symington (1996)
and Eigen (1998), while there is also a more “postmodern” tendency to romanticize and imaginatively
elaborate his writings (Grotstein, 2007) in a way
that while stimulated by his later more informal
clinical books (1974, 1975, 2005), nonetheless loses
much of his highly original, if often cryptic, dignity
and deeply moving sobriety.
3. Trigger (2003) located an early form of such a
recessive “despotic structure” in his observations on
the grave relics in early primitive kingships—in both
old and new worlds. He was struck by the extreme
and archeologically sudden difference between the
opulence of artifacts in the graves of the elite and the
comparative coarseness of these same objects in the
graves of the newly emerging mass of commoners—
many of whom, as artisans, would presumably have
made the objects of such beauty and refinement
found in the graves of the elite. The widespread
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appearance of human sacrifice in such societies
would be part of the enforcement of these newly
extreme disparities.
4. Although it may seem extreme to trace any direct
causation between capitalism and schizophrenia,
Sass (1992) has suggested that the high demands
for personal autonomy and competitive functioning
in modern economies may accentuate the isolation
and potential breakdown of patients who might
have adapted better to the slower pace of more
traditional agrarian societies. He also shows that
the extreme valuation of separate individuality in
capitalist societies is associated with modern art
forms that emphasize a “hyper-reflexivity” of inner
self consciousness that seems further exaggerated
in the “prodromal” and “first rank” symptoms of
schizophrenia. If one adds in the seemingly endemic
diagnoses of clinical depression and the extent of its
medications, it may be that capitalism is the form
of social organization that least protects the modern
individual from pushing creative sensitivities into
overt psychosis.
5. If Deleuze and Guattari (1972/2009) are correct
on radical individualization (their “schizophrenic
process”) as the only avenue for revolutionary social
change, and one sees the increasing economic
inequities and automation of many working roles as
examples of a newly emerging “despotic structure”
within global capitalism, then the mass creation of
large numbers of disenfranchised, unemployable
youth, along with the spreading despair and
alienation of their widespread drug use (for which
one can hardly blame them), seems a very high
price to pay for the small increase in the number of
revolutionarily creative individuals that might also
result on this model.
6. The French psychoanalyst Lacan (1973/1981)
suggested a further fundamental disparity or split
between the intrinsically undefined and “shapeless”
qualities of kinesthesis and the more “complete”
gestalts of the visually seen other, conferring some
degree of intrinsic predominance, convincingness,
and felt “reality” of the “other” over the more
phenomenologically open, kinesthetic sense of self.
Internalized as the structure of thought on the
model of Bion (1962) and Meltzoff (2002) this will
add an additional inner turbulence to that dialogic
matrix.
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7. The author (Hunt, 1995, 2000, 2011; and see also
Dale, 2014) has suggested that mystical states and
peak experiences, with their equilibrating oneness of
self and others, would represent, in Piagetian terms,
the initial appearance of a not commonly realized
“formal operations” in the “affective schemata” of a
separate developmental line of emotional intelligence.
This might be a more parsimonious account than
previous suggestions (Wilber, 1984) of spirituality as
the “post formal” stages of a single ladder model for
all intelligence.
8. Part of this reluctance on the part of Deleuze might
also have stemmed from his apparently intense
pre-academic immersion in more controversial
Hermetic and esoteric spiritual traditions (Ramey,
2012). This may have cast a more negative shadow
over the general area of such inquiry for the older
philosophical Deleuze, who seems to have preferred
an overview of spirituality based on the more
abstract immanence of Spinoza (Deleuze, 2001) to
any more detailed and explicit discussion of major
mystical traditions.
9. The later Deleuze (1991/1994, 1988/1993; Smith
& Somers-Hall, 2012) speculated about a potential
mathematics of the planes and shapes of analytic
geometry as underlying all such “machines” or self
organizing systems within mind and matter, thereby
perhaps also undercutting his earlier anticipation of
Lakoff and Johnson’s figural or metaphoric image
schemas for all thought. It may be a reflection of
the sheer difficulty of separating metaphor from
its literalizations that Bion (1965) too suggested,
but did not develop, a mathematical geometry as
the inner source of abstract thought. By contrast,
in the alternative primacy of figural metaphor as
understood by Lakoff and Johnson (1999) and
Hunt (1995, 2006, 2011), a shared matrix of spatial/
dynamic synesthetic patterns would be unfolded, at
its more abstract levels, within the representational
symbolisms as mathematics (Lakoff and Nunez,
2000) and in the presentational-aesthetic symbolisms
as the mandala/chakra forms of psychedelic and
mystical states. Rather than reducing any one
symbolic form to any other, it would seem more
plausible to show how each emerges from a shared
cross modal capacity, abstracted out of the separate
perceptual modalities and so available for all frames
of intelligence.

Almaas, A. H. (1984). The elixir of enlightenment. York
Beach, ME: Samuel Weiser.
Almaas, A. H. (1986). The void: A psychodynamic
investigation of the relationship between mind and
space. Berkeley, CA: Diamond Books.
Angyal, A. (1936). The experience of the body-self in
schizophrenia. Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry,
25, 1029-1053.
Bataille, G. (1988). Inner experience. Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press. (Original work
published 1954) .
Binswanger, L. (1963). Being-in-the-world: Selected
papers of Ludwig Binswanger. New York, NY: Basic
Books.
Bion, W. R. (1962). Learning from experience. London,
UK: William Heineman.
Bion, W. R. (1965). Transformations. New York, NY:
Basic Books.
Bion, W. R. (1967). Second thoughts. London, UK:
William Heineman.
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10. Almaas (1984) comments that the sheer simplicity
of Krishnamurti’s use of a nonspecialized ordinary
language to express his own realization makes it all
too easy for many readers to miss the depth and
profundity of what is described.
11. The striking overlap in concept and some phraseology
between Bion and Krishnamurti makes one
wonder if Bion, either in the 1930s when a younger
Krishnamurti was in England, or after 1968 when
Bion had re-settled in California and had begun to
read in the Bhagavad-Gita, might have attended
any of Krishnamurti’s public lectures. There is no
mention of any such contact in Bleandonu’s (1994)
biography of Bion, and the deceptive simplicity of
Krishnamurti’s language could certainly have either
remained as implicit background for Bion or been
independently developed as his own spontaneous
realization.
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